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Microeconomictheory of nonprofit institutions is currently a relatively
underdeveloped area of analysis. In an attempt to expand this body of
theory, the present paper applies the economic model of rational be-
havior to the Ph.D. production process within the university. In particu-
lar, economic analysis is used to explain the marked disciplinary differ-
ences in mean time to degree and in student attrition that have been the
subject of much recent discussion.' I think that the theory developed is
broadly applicable, although the data have been drawn primarily from the
University of California at Berkeley.
Section1contains data documenting departmental differences in
Ph. D. production, Section II develops the theory of departmental be-
havior, and Section III presents evidence in support of that theory. It
should be noted that the present paper has been distilled from a consid-
erably larger study, and much of the empirical work has been deleted.
The interested reader should refer to the author's dissertation2 for more
complete treatment of the topic.
I.DIFFERENCES IN DEPARTMENTAL
PERFORMANCE
Ina 1966 study3 prepared for the Graduate Division of the University of
California at Berkeley, sociologist Rodney Stark analyzed five cohorts of
3graduate students beginning graduate work at three-year intervals in
each of four Berkeley departments, English, History, Political Science,
and Chemistry. The success rates for each group, as of 1966, are pre-
sented in Table 1. Note the sharp contrast between Chemistry and the
TABLE1.The Outcome of Doctoral Studies by Department









Received Ph.D. 17% 14% 14% 4% 0%
Withdrew after M.A. 24 23 29 35 26
Withdrew—no degree 59 60 51 39 21
Still registered (1966) 0 3 6 14 53
On leave of absence 0 0 0 8 0
Number of students 29 35 49 49 42
Chemistry Department
68% Received Ph.D. 86% 77% 76% 0%
Withdrew after M.A. 7 6 10 8 0
Withdrew—no degree 7 17 12 16 2
Still registered (1966) 0 0 2 6 96
On leave of absence 0 0 0 2 2
Number of students 28 35 51 50 50
English Department
Received Ph.D. 13% 16% 15% 6% 0%
Withdrew after MA. 23 25 24 14 24
Withdrew—no degree 58 55 58 29 36
Still registered (1966) 3 0 3 37 34
On leave of absence 3 4 0 14 6
Number of students 31 38 53 49 50
History Department
Received Ph. D. 27% 12% 29% 8% 0%
Withdrew after MA. 15 27 13 18 14
Withdrew—no degree 52 54 52 31 46
Still registered (1966) 6 0 4 23 32
On leave of absence 0 7 2 20 8
Number of students 33 26 48 51 50
SOURCE:Unpublished study by
Berkeley, 1966.
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other three departments with respect to the per cent of successful Ph. D.
completions.
Table 2 contains the number of enrolled-graduate-student-years that
must be charged against the degree output of the four departments in
the Stark study. For the English, History, and Political Science depart-
ments, the figures represent the combined results of the 1951, 1954, and
1957 cohorts, while the 1960 cohort was also included for the Chemistry
Department, since that group was virtually complete by 1966. Note the
much shorter average time to degree in chemistry and the early occur-
rence of attrition in the program. By contrast, unsuccessful students in
the other three departments were not terminated or did not drop out
TABLE2 Enrolled Student Time per Degree, 1951-54-57













































































GraduateDivision, SOURCE:Stark study, Berkeley. 1966.
aLimitedto students who enrolled with BA. or BS. only. Chemistry includes the 1960cohort.
5 David W. Breneman
-Juntilan average of two to three years had been completed in the
program.
Data limitations prohibited preparation of similar cohort studies for a
larger number of Berkeley departments. However, degree-enrollment
ratios for the seven-year period 1961—67, presented in Table 3, indicate
the range of departmental variation.
Evidence that the differential pattern of attrition and time to degree
observed in Berkeley departments is not unique to that campus is found
in Joseph Mooney's recent study of attrition among Woodrow Wilson a
4 . I — Fellows.Mooney examined success rates as of 1966 for tne 1958—60
entering cohorts of Woodrow Wilson Fellows, and found the same (3
patternthat Berkeley displays—high success rates in the physical and
biological sciences followed by. the social sciences, with the humanities
C
apoor third.
Explanation of these differences found in the literature typically focus
upon such factors as variation in financial support, intrinsic differences in
fields, different traditions, and so forth. In particular, departments are
implicitly viewed as passive organizations lacking objectives regarding >,
thenumber of Ph. D. 's to award. No attempt has been made in previous .
workto analyze departmental objectives and the constraints under .0
whichdepartments operate, and to relate these factors to Ph.D. produc-
tion. The following theory attempts to fill that gap. - C-)
U) Cl)
II. A THEORY OF DEPARTMENTAL
BEHAVIOR . .
Dc
The system that we wish to analyze is far from simple. The production of
Ph. D. 's involves the joint and interacting behavior of two groups, faculty
and students, whose objectives may be more in conflict than in agree- 0
ment.Furthermore, individual faculty members have personal objec- =
tives, from which we must construct a description of departmental objec-
tives. Thus, our theory must consider student and faculty motivation, and W
combinethese into a theory of departmental behavior.
In Section A, a theory of graduate student behavior will be presented,
followed in Section B by a theory of faculty motivation. The second
section will also examine the relation of faculty objectives to departmental
objectives. Section C will discuss the factors that enter into the depart- Cl)
ment's objective function, and in Section D the elements of analysis will
be synthesized into a theory that explains departmental differences in
. patternand timing of graduate student attrition. j
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I—A. The Graduate Student
Iassume that the vast majority of graduate students view the decision
to enter graduate school as an investment, much as the human capi-
talliteraturesuggests.However,inthe case of the Ph.D.,for
those people intent upon an academic career the relevant variable is not
necessarily the rate of return calculated in money terms, but the in-
vestment in a life-style. Inasmuch as the Ph.D. is the required "union
card" of the college professor, one might view the investment decision
from the student's point of view as a step function (see Figure 1). The
student may study for several years, but if he fails to earn the degree, his
payoff iseffectively zero, thereby making his investment extremely
costly to him.5
In considering this model of the student's view of the value of incom-
plete degree work, it is important to remember the reason for the discon-
tinuity in the function; apart from income considerations, the step sig-
nifies that the degree winner is properly certified and acceptable for types
of employment not open to individuals without the degree, We shall
assume this factor to be of primary importance to students and shall
continue to represent the investment as having a sharp discontinuity.
Given the investment model of student behavior, economic theory
would suggest that students as potential investors will gather information
regarding the costs of investment, the anticipated benefits (pecuniary and
nonpecuniary), and the risks surrounding successful completion of the
program, and will embark upon graduate study only if the present value of
the benefits, adjusted for risk, exceeds the present value of the costs.
Certain costs can be determined with some precision; these include the
opportunity cost of forgone earnings, tuition, and out-of-pocket costs.
Other elements in the cost-benefit analysis however, are subject to con-
siderable uncertainty. In evaluating factors such as the length of time
required to earn a degree, sources of financial support, and the probabil-
ity of successful completion, the student must rely upon information he
can gain from the department and other sources such as friends already in
the program. One of the most important items of information needed for
an informed decision is the probability of successful completion. This is
unknown for any individual student, but a reasonable proxy would be the
historical experience of students in the department; if y students have
enrolled over the past several years and x students have earned the
doctorate, then a reasonable probability estimate of successful completion
would be rig. Unfortunately, this rudimentary piece of information is not
generally available, leaving the student unable to make an informed
estimate of the risk involved.
Knowledge of the demand for one's services upon successful comple-
tion of the doctorate would be an additional piece of information needed
9 David W. BrenemanThe following
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for an informed investment decision. Hard information on this item is tionally calculat
essentially unavailable to the student for at least two reasons.First, in an offer fror
studies of the academic markets6 have all commented on the limited psychic return
information available to participants in these markets. Most universities The precedit
do not publicly advertise their openings, and no central clearinghouse stretch out thei
exists to provide complete job coverage. Second, the length of the related to the t'
production cycle (approximately five years) means that a student would the opportunity
need a forecast of demand five years hence, a difficult prospect at best. of field, this ai
Demand in governmental and industrial markets may be better adver- tween departm
tised, but the need to forecast years ahead again clouds the picture. look elsewhere
The lack of specific information regarding market demand for Ph. D. '5 attritionamong
has probably not been a deterrent to students during the 1950s and The propose
1960s, because of a general belief that the country was desperately short 1The stud
of Ph. D. 's. The baby boom, the tremendous expansion of college en- rather th
roilments, and the increasing proportion of the 18 to 21 age group going 2.The inve
on to college during this period resulted in a series of crisis forecasts, successfti
sparked by the National Education Association biennial surveys,7 which to incom
appear to have been widely circulated and believed. Hence, it is reason- 3.The invé
able to assume that during the period under study, students believed but is vie
that many employers would demand their services, regardless of their into
field.
11 David W
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The following implications for rational student behavior can be de-
duced from the investment model of student motivation coupled with
the discontinuity in the payoff function. (We assume that students can
control within limits the speed with which they progress through the
program and are free to withdraw at any point.) From the standpoint of
the cost of earning the doctorate, of which much is borne by the
student, we might conclude that all students will proceed through the
program as rapidly as possible, i.e. students will take full course loads,
prepare for examinations as rapidly as possible, and not waste time
getting started and finishing the dissertation. However, given the nature
of the payoff function, rational behavior may result in a decision to
proceed more slowly in order to maintain higher grades, improve class
standing, earn or keep fellowships, and so forth. To the extent that these
factors operate in all fields, we should not expect any departmental
differences in the time to degree to arise from this source. However,
because opportunity costs do differ between fields, we might expect,
ceteris paribus, that students in disciplines with high starting Ph.D.
salaries would be less willing to slow their own progress than would
students in less well-paying fields. For example, a chemistry student
planning to enter industry sees the cost of an additional year in the
program as $15,000, while the philosophy student may see a cost of
$9,000 for an additional year's work. Furthermore, the philosophy stu-
dent is presumably aiming at an academic position, and he may ra-
tionally calculate that an additional year's work on his thesis may result
in an offer from a more prestigious university, thereby increasing the
psychic return on the investment.
The preceding analysis suggests that students acting rationally may
stretch out their degree programs, and argues that this decisiOn may be
related to the type of employment sought by the Ph. D. candidate and to
the opportunity costs related to that employment. However, regardless
of field, this analysis does not explain the differences in attrition be-
tween departments as a function of student decisions. Thus, we must
look elsewhere for our theoretical explanation of the large differences in
attrition among the disciplines.
The proposed model of student behavior is summarized as follows:
1.The student, regardless of field or sex, is viewed as an investor
rather than a consumer of graduate education.
2.The investment requires the earning of the Ph. D. degree for its
successful completion, i.e. the student attaches little if any value
to incomplete degree work.
3.The investment is not properly evaluated in money terms alone,
but is viewed by the student as an investment necessary for entry
into certain occupations requiring the doctorate.
11 David W. Breneman4.The potential graduate student has very limited information re- faculty member garding his probability of successfully completing the degree and the university c regarding the demand for his services upon completion of the tenure offers. 1 program. He undertakes the investment in the face of this uncer- values of resear tainty, because he assumes that the department will treat him and still produc justly and that satisfactory employment will be available, i.e. he In addition tc assumes that the demand for Ph. D. 's in his field will be strong bers have many when he graduates. sor's prestige in
5.The rational student may have sound reasons for lengthening his his bargaining
time to degree, and departmental differences in average time to faster promotioi
degree may be partly explained by the differences in opportunity addition, increa costs seen by students in different fields. However, analysis of number of comi
student behavior does not provide an explanation for departmen- increasing his in
tal differences in attrition. funding of
easier access to
teem, which is
short, most of t B.The Individual Faculty Member and by theDepartment academicwho s
My ultimate aim is to propose a theory of departmental behavior, but I If we assume
must first explain my use of the term "the department." For present the sum of the
purposes, the members of the department are defined to include all maximizing beh
faculty members, tenured and nontenured, who are employed full time maximization of
by the university.I exclude from this definition students, teaching low and McCei
assistants, associate lecturers, and other nonregular faculty ranks. Thus, relationship bet
in seeking a theory of departmental behavior, I must propose a theory of
faculty behavior and determine whether goals of individual professors The relationsh
blend consistently into a unified set of goals for the department. department m
The fundamental assumption of the analysis is that behavior of the sonal prestige
faculty members may be explained by the theory of utility maximization. tige, and vice
Let us assume that the representative faculty member at a university prestige of th
enhance it,sii such as Berkeley, regardless of field and rank, seeks to maximize his own
each prestige. Using Merton's distinction, faculty members at a large univer-
sity such as Berkeley are "cosmopolitans" rather than "locals," i.e. Thus, in the re primary loyalty is to the discipline rather than to the employing institu-
tion. Prestige, therefore,is understood to mean a professor's profes- of prestige
havior of indivi sional reputation within the discipline as judged by peers in the same
field in other universities. Reputation is enhanced by the quality of a Departmenti
determined on person's research publications and by the quality of the graduate stu- same discipline dents who serve as apprentices to the professor. Report,9 are Pt It seems reasonable to assume that nearly all faculty members at of faculty, ther Berkeley accept this value system or behave as if they do. Initially, a that ratings an considerable self-selection process operates to minimize the number of are forced int






































faculty members on the staff not interested in research. Furthermore,
the university discards those members who fail to produce by refusing
tenure offers. Thus, survival on the faculty requires adherence to the
values of research, or an uncanny ability to disguise one's true interests
and still produce the minimum acceptable amount of research work.
In addition to these negative considerations, however, faculty mem-
bers have many positive reasons for prestige maximizing. As a profes-
sor's prestige increases, his value to the institution also increases. Thus
his bargaining power increases and he can command a higher income,
faster promotion, a reduced teaching load, and other perquisites. In
addition, increased prestige renders him potentially more valuable to a
number of competing universities, who will bid for his services, thereby
increasing his independence and mobility. In those fields where external
funding of research projects is common, increased prestige will result in
easier access to these funds. Increased prestige also enhances self-es-
teem, which is of no small value to people in intellectual occupations. In
short, most of the objects that philosophers have recognized as desired
by people—power, income, independence, self-esteem—accrue to the
academic who successfully maximizes prestige.
If we assume that the prestige of an academic department is simply
the sum of the prestige levels of its faculty members, then prestige-
maximizing behavior on the part of each professor is consistent with the
maximization of departmental prestige. The following passage from Cap-
low and McGee's The Academic Marketplace describes the symbiotic
relationship between professor and department:
The relationship between departmental prestige and the personal prestige of
department members is reciprocal. Over a period of time, each man's per-
sonal prestige in his discipline is a partial function of his department's pres-
tige, and vice versa.It becomes vitally important, then,to maintain the
prestige of the department by hiring only individuals who seem likely to
enhance it, since a decline in departmental prestige will be experienced by
each individual member as a decline in his own prestige.8
Thus, in the remaining analysis, we shall speak of the department's goal
of prestige maximization, grounded in the rational, self-regarding be-
havior of individual professors.
Departmental prestige is not, of course, an absolute measure but is
determined on a relative scale by comparison with departments in the
same discipline in other universities. Surveys, such as the 1966 Cartter
Report,9 are published periodically, ranking departments by the quality
of faculty, thereby establishing relative prestige ratings. To the extent
that ratings are reported by simple numerical orderings, departments
are forced into a competitive zero sum game, i.e.in order for one
13 David W. Brenemanthe department.
department to rise in the ratings, another department must fall. Thus, in less able graduat
order to maximize departmental prestige, a department must compete each year may e
successfully for prestigious faculty, and this requires resources. From will it be in the
the department's perspective, the Dean is the primary supplier of re- complete the de
sources, and the competitors are the other academic departments under best students, a
the Dean's jurisdiction. Therefore, it seems certain that each depart- placed well n
ment will discover the basis for resource acquisition within the univer- could only be p
sity, and will behave in accordance with the incentive system in order to cessfully
maximize command over resources. able to
Specification of resources is reasonably straightforward, and includes produce Ph.
the number of full time equivalent (FTE) faculty, teaching and re- Consideration
search assistantship (T.A. and R.A.) positions, salary money, funds for attention to the
research, space, computer time, funds for library acquisitions, and so disciplines,sue
forth. In particular, it is assumed that departments are highly motivated employment
to maintain or increase their number of faculty FTE positions, for in this graduates in the
way new people can be brought into the department periodically, ment as well. P
thereby insuring against stagnation. A desire for increased faculty can be try are outside I
understoodas allowing increased specialization, broader coverage of the majority of thes
discipline, reduced teaching loads, and increased prestige. ment's prestige.
The connection between graduate students and prestige must now be is to make the
introduced. Unlike undergraduates and M.A. candidates, doctoral stu- function of the
dents are part of the prestige system, since many new Ph. D. 's remain in The departrnen
academia. The apprentice system, whereby a Ph. D. candidate corn- controlling van
pletes his research under the guidance of a faculty adviser, tends to link number and
the two individuals so that the work produced will reflect credit or teaching and n
discredit upon them jointly,if not equally.Thus,theprestige- Because contro
maximizing professor has a definite incentive to seek out the best must look at de
graduate students and to avoid the worst, hoping that some other order to develo
professor will be foolish enough to adopt that burden. If a professor is ' duction.
successful in this strategy for several years, his reputation as an effective Before sumr
and desirable adviser will result in the better students seeking him out. control
Sirnilarly, a professor who has consistently been willing to work with the variables can b
poorer students, find himself unable to attract any of the better information, ar
students. Thus, the quality of student research with which the latter
man is associated will decline, and his prestige in the field will suffer
correspondingly.'° Admissions
Note that the major visible test of the quality of the student and his
work is the job placement which he achieves. The student's thesis is Until very reci
actually read by very few people, and thus judgment must be made in a• graduate admi
derivative manner by assuming that the "best" students will be hired by candidates to a
the "best" universities. Thus, within the profession, the quality of job largely under
placement reflects credit or discredit on the student, his adviser, and
15
14 The Ph.D. Production Processthe department. Given this analysis, we can conclude that a number of
less able graduate students who manage to reach the dissertation stage
each year may experience difficulty in securing a thesis adviser.'1 Nor
will it be in the interest of the department to insure that such students
complete the degree, for the department rationally seeks to attract the
best students, award the Ph. D. degree to those students who can be
placed well in other universities, and discourage those students who
could only be placed in low-prestige positions. A department that suc-
cessftilly pursues this policy will enhance its own prestige and will be
able to attract better students than those departments foolish enough to
produce Ph. D. 's for low-prestige institutions.
Consideration of the quality of placement of new Ph. D. 's directs our
attention to the job market faced by graduates in each field. In certain
disciplines,such as the humanities,virtually the only acceptable
employment availableiscollegeoruniversityteaching,whereas
graduates in the sciences may enter industrial or governmental employ-
ment as well. Ph. D. 's who accept employment in government or indus-
try are outside the academic prestige system entirely, meaning that the
majority of these placements will have a neutral impact on the depart-
ment's prestige. The implication for our model of departmental behavior
is to make the optimal output of the prestige-maximizing department a
function of the demand conditions in the job market for each discipline.
The department can regulate the supply of new Ph. D. 's produced by
controlling variables such as admission and performance standards, the
number and type of requirements included in the curriculum, the use of
teaching and research assistantships, and the allocation of fellowships.
Because control over the process is lodged within the department, we
must look at departmental objectives and the institutional constraints in
order to develop a plausible theory. of the determinants of Ph.D. pro-
duction.
•Before summarizing this section, a more specific discussion of the
control variables available to the department may be in order. These
variables can be organized under four headings: admissions, curriculum,
information, and use of resources.
Admissions
Until very recently, each academic department at Berkeley set its own
graduate admissions standards and determined the number of Ph. D.
candidates to admit. Thus, the number of Ph. D. students was a variable
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15 David W. BrenemanCurriculum i,'
The department exercises virtually complete, control over the cur-
riculum, including the number of required courses, their sequence,
grades and grade requirements, standards exacted on screening and
qualifying examinations, and the nature of th.e dissertation required. The
curriculum will affect attrition in two ways. First, the timing Of examina-
tions and the standards set will directly affect attrition patterns in the
obvious way. The decision on standards determines ratherprecisely the
number allowed to continue, and the timing obviously affects the
number of years a student spends before being rejected. Second, in a
clumsier and less controllable manner, the longer, the less precise and
less articulated the curriculum, the higher the likelihood of attrition. A
student who feels that he is making no clear progress toward the degree
may experience frustration and discouragement, and will reduce his
estimate of the probability of success, possibly reaching a point where
the expected present value of the benefits does not exceed the present

















The department can exert a strong influence on the individual student's
estimate of the probability of success by controlling information needed
by the student in making that estimate. Periodic evaluations of the
student's progress, interpretation of test results, even chance comments,
are the data points which the student uses in constantly revising his
estimate of the risk factor. A department that wants to keep a student in
the program must provide feedback designed to maintain the student's











Given the resources available for student support in each field, we
assume that departments may organize their fellowships, teaching assis-
tantships, and research assistantships in a variety of ways, and some
ways may be better than others, judged by the criterion of Ph. D.
production. One would expect the more productive departments to have
a policy of financial support designed to provide funds in the most useful
way to a student at each phase of the program.
Our analysis of the faculty member and the department can be sum-
marized:
1.The faculty member is assumed to be rationally attempting to
maximize his own prestige, and this behavior on the part of all



















n patterns in the
ther precisely the
'ously affects the
ted. Second, in a
e less precise and
od of attrition. A
oward the degree
will reduce his












tenon of Ph. D.
artments to have
the most useful
ent can be sum-
y attempting to
n the part of all
members of a department is consistent with maximization of de-
partmental prestige.
2.Departmental prestige is a function of resources and the quality of
placement of its Ph.D. students within the prestige system. Indi-
viduals who accept industrial or governmental jobs are outside the
academic prestige system and this type of placement is viewed
as neutral, or in some cases, positively prestigious.
3.Considerations of the quality of placement forces the analysis to
include the nature of demand for new Ph. D. 's in each field as a
determinant of the prestige-maximizing level of doctoral output.
4.The department was shown to have control over the factors as-
sumed to affect the rate and timing of attrition. These include
admissions policy, curriculum design, information, and organiza-
tion of resources for financial support.
C.Analysis of the Department's Objective Function
In the previous section it was argued that departmental prestige is a
function of two variables: (1) resources; (2) quality of Ph. D. placement.
We must now examine these two variables in order to understand how
they are determined.
In California, the following formula has been developed with the State
Department of Finance to determine the numbers of FFE faculty posi-
tions that the state will fund:'2
FTE Faculty =1.OLD+ 1.5UD + 2.50G + 3.5AD
28
where
LD =numberof FTE lower-division students enrolled;
UDnumber of FTE upper-division students enrolled;
OG =numberof FTE Master's candidates and first-year doctoral students
enrolled; and
AD =numberof FTE advanced doctoral students enrolled.
In other words, the state is committed in principle to a weighted 28 to 1
student-faculty ratio. Note that each advanced doctoral student enrolled
brings the campus Vs FTE faculty position.
Internally, there is considerable evidence indicating that allocation of
FTE positions to departments closely follows the same weighted enroll-
ment formula. Interviews with Budget Office personnel revealed that
departmental requests for new positions are often bolstered by enr'oll-
ment figures, and cross-section regression analysis indicated that weight-
17 David W. Brenemaned enrollments "explain" approximately 82 per cent of the variation in
departmental staffing. Therefore, although the formula expressed in
equation 1 is not followed mechanically at the departmental level,it
seems reasonably clear that departments are awarded faculty positions
on the basis of weighted student enrollments. Once the number of
faculty positions for each department has been determined, other re-
sources such as office space and nonacademic personnel can be function-
ally related to the faculty. numbers. Thus, the resource allocation process
can be viewed as a two-stage process (see Figure 2).
The second element of the department's prestige function is the
quality of placement achieved by the department's doctoral students.
Quality of placement for each year's group of students will be a function
of the number produced and the demand for Ph.D. 's in a field. The
following simple model may clarify the process of placement.
We begin with the following assumptions:
1.Assume that at any point in time a department can rank its
graduate students from best to worst.
2.Assume also that a department and its graduate students would
generally agree on a ranking of university, college, and junior-
college departments according to prestige. (We might think of a
clustering of colleges and universities into five broad groups,
rated along the scale from high, positive prestige to low, negative
prestige.)
3.Assume that regardless of the rate of attrition, the department
will view those students who complete the Ph. D. as its best
students. In other words, assume that the awarding of Ph. D. 's
follows the student rank ordering, so that if 3 students out of 10
receive the doctorate, the department will view the successful
candidates as the 3 best students.
4.Considering just the academic market, assume a strong positive
correlation between the prestige ordering of job offers and the
department's rank ordering of its successful Ph. D. candidates.
5.Assume that a student with multiple offers will accept the most
prestigious position.
Given these assumptions, our model of the market's functioning as
viewed by the department is depicted as in Figure 3.
Since it has been argued that the department controls the number of
Ph. D. 's it produces, the decision problem facing the department is to
determine where in the rank ordering of students it should draw the
line. The actual number cannot be precisely controlled because of ran-
dom factors, but one can assume that a department knows approximately
how much attrition a particular curriculum, set of standards, and level of
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FIGURE 2
sumedto have considerable knowledge of its production function. The
fundamentalhypothesis is that the decision on where to draw the line is
a function of the department's perceived demand curve for its graduates.
In Figure 3, a department wishing to maximize prestige by avoiding
placement in schools with negative prestige would only award Ph.D.
degrees to the six "best" students, resulting in an attrition rate of 50 per
cent.
The introduction of another large employing sector, such as industry,
provides the department with an escape hatch from the prestige system.
In the previous example, all the department's products were forced into
the academic market; thus, to avoid poor placement, a department must
create a certain amount of attrition. However, a department such as
Chemistry enjoys a large, nonacademic demand for its Ph. D's, and is
therefore not under pressure to create attrition as is a department
lacking that outlet.
The elements of a theory explaining differences in attrition rates by
department are now complete.
D. TheTheory of Departmental Attrition
The theory of departmental attrition follows in a direct and simple way
from the previous discussion. In this section, a simple analytic model
will be developed to explain the differences in departmental success
rates. In the following section, comments on the differences in timing of
attrition will be made.
The Theory of Different Success Rates
It should be stressed that this theory describes the long-run adjustment
of a department. Academic departments are relatively slow in their
ability to react to changing circumstances; the loose form of organization
and the collegial system insures this, Furthermore, we know that much
uncertainty and many randOm factors affect the system under discussion,
while the theory describes a department operating with full information
and considerable foresight. Nonetheless, the following simple model
captures the essence of the optimization problem facing the department.














NOTE:Dotted lines indicate job offers.
FIGURE 3
We have assumed the department's objective to be prestige maximiza-
tion. Prestige was discussed in terms of the department's ability to
attract and hold good people, and its ability to place its doctoral students
well. Following the logic of the last section, this reduced operationally to
command over resources and the number of Ph. D. 's produced. The
functional relationships implied can be expressed as follows:
(1) Prestigef (resources, number of Ph.D's produced)
(2) Resources =g(enrollments)
(3) Number of Ph.D. 's produced =h(enrollments).









sources over a ra
the function. Tht.



































universities Our interest focuseson relation 3 which defines the attrition rate. I
by prestige have arguedthatthisfunction is not technologically determined, but is
subject to departmental control. The model provides one plausible hy-
pothesisto explain why departments differ with regard to relationship 3.
Graphically, the functions might be expressed as they are in Figures 4
through 7.
Figure 4 depicts a linear relationship between enrollments and re-
sources over a range from X0 to X1, with a kink at X1 and a leveling of
the function. The kink at X1 recognizes the fact that departments are
not free to expand enrollments indefinitely, that limits are imposed by
scarce resources and administrative control.
Figure 5 sketches one possible relation between doctoral enrollment
and Ph.D.'s produced. Of particular interest is the angle 0, which can
range over values from 00to45°, with 00representing100percent
attrition and 45° representing no attrition.
Figure 6 depicts the relation between resources and prestige. The
function may or may not be linear; the only restriction is that it be
monotopically increasing.
Figure 7 represents one possible relationship between the number of
Ph. D. 's produced and departmental prestige. This particular graph
might represent a field serving only the academic market, with the
shape of the function following directly from the analysis of the previous
section. This particular function isalso properly interpreted as the
department's perceived demand curve for its Ph.D. products. The shape
of the function will vary according to the nature of the market served.
These functions are now linked together as a system to show how the
department's prestige-maximizing behavior determines the optimal attri-
tion rate. The French and Chemistry departments, representing the
extremes of departmental behavior, will be examined.
The French Department is a typical humanities department whose
Ph. D. 's only enter academia. For the past twenty-one years, the de-
partment at Berkeley has awarded between one and five Ph. D. 's a year
maximiza- despite a rising enrollment. Our theory suggests that this behavior
ability to would be consistent with a perceived demand curve of the type sketched
doctoral students in quadrant III of Figure 8. Given a stable market without large fiuctua-
led operationally to tionsindemand,thedepartment'sprestige-maximizinglong-run
's produced. The equilibrium output would be three Ph. D. 's per year, with small ex-
follows: pected variance caused by random factors. This output rate will insure
P2 units of prestige from placement.
The combination of quadrants I and II indicate that the department
will enroll the maximum allowable, E1, in order to receive R1 re-
sources, producing P1 units of prestige.
The angle 01 in quadrant IV, the department's optimal attrition rate,
21 David W. BrenemanResources No. of Ph. D's Ph
is now completely determined by the intersection of the prestige-
maximizing enrollment and output decisions from quadrants I and III.
Maximum prestige possible, P1 + P2, is attained with the department
not having to trade off one determinant of prestige against the other.
Regardless of department, quadrants I and II remain essentially un-
changed, i.e., departments have incentive to maintain enrollments at a
maximum. Thus, the market will determine the angle 0 for each de-
partment.
Relative to a field such as French, the market during the 1950s arid
1960s for Ph. D. chemists was very strong and diversified. Fewer than 50
per cent of the chemists produced by graduate departments accepted
academic positions,'3 as industrial firms sought to hire these individuals.
In this circumstance, one mightassume that,the Chemistry Department
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FIGURE 8 Case 1, French Department
dentreceiving multiple offers, all of them satisfactory placements. A
discipline in this fortunate position would have no need to organize the
program to insure a certain level of attrition; in fact, every effort would
be made to produce as many Ph. D. 's as possible, resulting in an angle 02
verynear to This field would be graphed as follows in Figure 9.
The two polar cases demonstrate how market forces operate upon
prestige maximizing departments to produce different rates of attrition.
We must now turn our attention to the differences in timing of attrition
observed among departments.
The Theory of Differences in Attrition Patterns
As mentioned earlier, Stark's study'4 revealed two disturbing aspects of
attrition at Berkeley, the differences in departmental success rates and












tsthe differences in timing of attrition. Thus, not only did the Chemistry
Department have a high success rate, but the attrition occurred almost
entirely within the first year. By contrast, the other three fields had
numerous students enrolled for two, three, or even four years before
leaving without a degree. The theory presented in the first part of this
section explained differences in success rates; the purpose of this section
wiii be to present a theory to explain the differences in timing of
attrition.
As in the first part, the theory will concentrate upon the department's
role, with emphasis placed upon the production functions in each field
and the internal economy of departments. The nature of faculty input
and the role of physical capital in the production process will be relevant
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Consider first the economy of the French Department. Previously it
was suggested that the demand for Ph.D. 's in French is not great and
has been reasonably stable during the last several years, relative to many
other disciplines. It was argued that this fact explains the low success
rate in French. Weakness in the market also explains the lack of financial
support available to graduate students in French. The department,
however, has a demand for graduate students based on its need to
produce student credit hours to maintain its claim over university re-
sources. Furthermore, the presence of numerous graduate students
generates demand for advanced courses in highly specialized areas of
French literature, the type of courses that faculty members like to teach.
The department's demand for graduate students coupled with the mini-
mal demand for French Ph. D. 's would pose a serious problem were it
not for the presence of Letters and Science undergraduates who are
required to complete four quarters of a foreign language.'5 This re-
quirement generates a large demand for teaching assistants and solves
the department's problem of providing financial support for graduate
students. Thus, the economy of this department rests, somewhat peril-
ously, on the demand for undergraduate instruction artificially created
by breadth requirements.
The technology of Ph.D. production in this field is reasonably simple,
and from the department's point of view, inexpensive. Faculty input is
limited to course offerings, testing, and thesis advising; capital require-
ments are classroom space and library facilities, provided by university
funds. The department has no incentive to economize on the use of
resources required to produce Ph. D. 's; in fact, there is every incentive
to maximize use and control over such resources.
•From the perspective of the French faculty, then, the graduate stu-
dent must be viewed as a very valuable member of the department's
economy. Not only does the graduate student teach the dull introduc-
tory courses, but he is a source of student credit hours and demand for
advanced instruction.Departmental technology issuch that having
graduate students in residence for several years is costless to the faculty,
and not without certain advantages.First, the experienced teaching
assistant requires minimal supervision; if graduate turnover were high,
faculty would be forced to spend more time working with the fledgling
teachers. In addition, second- and third-year graduates can be expected
to enroll in more advanced courses, thereby allowing increased faculty
specialization. Consequently, in this type of department, faculty mem-
bers have no incentives to make rapid decisions to terminate Ph. D.
aspirants. Graduate students are particularly valuable assets to such
departments and will be kept in residence as long as possible. Eventu-
ally, fatigue, financial pressures, or the dissertation will produce the
necessary attrition.
25 David W. BrertemanLinking the analysis of the first part with the above, we have a picture professor's reseaj
of a humanities department desiring a high attrition rate, but not want- research assistan
ing this to occur. within the early years of the student's graduate career. with
If this is an accurate description of the department's objectives, we expects satjsfactc
would expect to find the following features of the graduate program: failto produce,
1.Critical hurdles designed to eliminate candidates in the late Therefore, the
rather than in the early stages of the program. this type of emb
2.A curriculum sufficiently ambiguous and fuzzy to keep students poor job market1
mildly confused about their rate of progress toward the degree. occur early in tI
3.Conscious minimization of the student's feeling that he is a ment in the
member of a particular graduate class or cohort. A student time makes
aminimum of checkpoints by which to measure his department to
progress. Note the
4.Feedback from the department designed to keep the student's and Chemistry
estimate of success high. may need exper
5.Extremely demanding requirements for the dissertation,this budget. This cos
being the final hurdle for the degree. ment, i.e., the
6.Use of the same individuals as teaching assistants for several cost function.
years. department will
7.Absence of discussion or information related to the job market library. By contil
for Ph. D. '5. externalfunding
8.A general lack of information about the historical success rates of formance of grad
graduate students, attrition patterns, and so forth. The best sor's cost ftinctioi
policy for the department would be to minimize information work is done.
flows to the students. Although both
9.A tendency for the department not to keep detailed records on an input in the
the experiences of past graduate students. Department prir
10.Little evidence of major curriculum revisions, while the Frenci
By way of contrast, let us now consider a natural science department Given the reseaj
such as Chemistry. Stark's study demonstrated that virtually all of the the needs of thE
attrition in this field occurs infirst year. Why might this be? quirements mua
First, our earlier analysis suggested that this department, having faced ment.
an excellent market during the 1950s and through most of the 1960s, Our analysis o
would have had little reason to want any particular level of attrition; in the department
fact, market factors alone may have dictated a zero attrition rate as eliminating from
optimal. Under these circumstances, the department would have no risks. That done
incentive to delay a decision on a student until the second or third year. designed to get
Students who appear short on intelligence or motivation should be
spotted quickly and removed to make roOm for others who will be
successful.
Departmental technology also plays an important role in this type of
field. Unlike the humanities, a doctoral student in chemistry may easily
require thousands of dollars worth of expensive equipment for disserta-
tion research. This equipment is often purchased from the funds of a
26 The Ph.D. Production Process 27 Davidin this type of
may easily
for disserta-
the funds of a
professor's research grant. The professor, having hired the student as a
research assistant, cannot afford to have someone incompetent working
with equipment purchased from his grant, since the funding agency
expects satisfactory research results. Should a student in this situation
fail to produce, the professor would bear a large part of the cost.
Therefore, the department must do its screening early to protect against
this type of embarrassment. Even if the Chemistry Department faced a
poor job market, the above considerations suggest that attrition would
occur early in the program. The inclusion of expensive capital equip-
ment in the production function plus a heavier involvement of faculty
time makes attrition in the third or fourth year too expensive for the
department to bear.
Note the fundamental difference between the cost functions in French
and Chemistry departments. An advanced doctoral student in French
may need expensive library resources, funded through the university
budget. This cost is not borne by any professor in the French Depart-
ment, i.e., the cost is not included in the professor's or the department's
cost function.If the student failsto complete the dissertation, the
department will still benefit from the enlarged French collection in the
library. By contrast, chemistry professors are directly accountable to the
external funding agencies which support their research; thus, the per-
formance of graduate students is incorporated into the individual profes-
sor's cost function, providing the professor with incentive to see that the
work is done.
Although both departments have a demand for graduate students as
an input in the production of student credit hours, the Chemistry
Department primarily needs graduate students for research assistance,
while the French Department's primary need is for teaching assistance.
Given the research orientation of the Ph. D. degree, it is obvious that
the needs of the Chemistry Department coincide with the degree re-
quirements much more closely than do those of the French Depart-
ment.
Our analysis of the Chemistry Department's technology suggests that
the department will screen its students closely during the first year,
eliminating from the program students who might be poor research
risks. That done, one would expect a rationally organized curriculum
designed to get students through quickly and into the market.
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27 David W. BrenemanIII. EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE THEORY
A. The Demand for Ph.D.'s
Writingin 1966, Allan Cartter made the following observation:
Considering the importance of the problem to higher education, and the
many hundreds of millions of dollars appropriated by the federal government
for the expansion of graduate education over the last few years, it is rather
astonishing that we know so little about the present and probable supply and
demand of college teachers.'6
Cartter was referring to our ignorance regarding aggregate supply and
demand for Ph. D. 's; he later comments that we know even less about
supply and demand by field. 17 In particular, we lack reliable time series
data on demand for Ph. D. 's by discipline.
In his 1965 study, Academic Labor Markets,'8 prepared for the U.S.
Department of Labor, David Brown proposes several measures for com-
paring excess demand across fields:'9
1.starting salaries of newly graduated Ph. D. '5;
2.extent of salary increase;
3.salaries paid to full professors in 1962—63;
4.academic rank of newly graduated Ph. D. 'S;
5.unfilled positions as a percentage of all positions;
6.percentage of newly graduated Ph. D. 's entering college teaching;
and
7.expansion demand as a percentage of all hiring.
Brown argues that none of the above measures taken separately
adequately captures the relative supply-demand balance across fields;
however, survey data Brown collected allowed him to rank 23 disciplines
on each of the seven measures. These separate rankings were then
combined into a single shortage index for 1964, reproduced as Table 4.
In commenting on these rankings, Brown stresses that, "The individual
discipline markets are tighter in the expanding fields and in those fields
wheretheopportunitiesoutsidetheacademiccommunityare
greatest. "20
Inconsidering Brown's data, we merely note that those fields in high
demand in 1964, the hard sciences and engineering, are the fields with
minimal attrition and shorter time-to-degree at Berkeley, while the
fields with lesser demand, the humanities, are the high attrition, lengthy
time-to-degree programs at Berkeley. Thus, these data are consistent
with the demand-oriented theory of Ph. D. production. Further refer-
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Earth Sciences and Geology 15
General Biology 16
Biochemistry 17
Physical Education and Health 18
Music 19
General Zoology 20
English and Literature 21
History 22
French 23
SOURCE:David Brown, Academic LaborMarkets.
Bank of I means excess demand greatest in that discipline.
B.The Supply of Ph.D.'s
Althoughwe have no precise method for determining the demand
schedule for Ph. D. 's by field over time, annual figures are available on the
supply of new doctorates. In assessing departmental performance, a com-
parison of Berkeley's doctoral output with national production of Ph. D. 's
adds to the plausibility of our market-oriented theory.
Data were collected on doctorates awarded annually by field for the
21-year period, 1947—48 to 1967—68. In addition to total production,
degrees awarded by the top 20 quality ranked schools21 in each disci-
pline were recorded. Table 5 presents the 21-year totals for each field.
Examination of the column headed "Berkeley % of Top 20" dem-
onstrates that Berkeley is a significant producer in all subject areas. For
example, Berkeley's forty-one Ph. D. 's in Spanish (an average of two per





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7year) still represents 6.3 per cent of the production by the top 20 schools.
Interms of sheer numbers, a recent publication of the National Research a.
Council, Report on Doctoral Programs, shows that Berkeley ranked fifth
out of 184 institutions in total doctorate production for the period 1958—
62, and first out of 213 for the period 1963_67.22 Of the fields considered
in this study, Berkeley's lowest departmental ranking in terms of Ph. D. —
outputfor the period 1963—67 was thirteenth out of 102 in the English 0
andAmerican Language and Literature category.23 In virtually every
other field, Berkeley ranked within the top four producers. Forgetting
departmental enrollments and looking just at output, there would seem to
be little cause for concern. .
Shiftingto individual fields, consider the supply of French Ph.D. s, o
reported in Table 6. Note that Berkeley's output of two to three Ph.D. 's 2
peryear generally accounted for 4 to 6 per cent of top 20 production. One
realizeshow thin the market for French Ph. D. 's is by recalling that
Brown's shortage index ranked this field last in terms of excess demand
during the middle 1960s; in fact, Brown referred to French as one of the 9)
surplus disciplines. And yet, during that period, total production aver-
aged only seventy Ph.D.'s, per year with the top 20 schools averaging 5 a
approximately fifty Ph.D. 's.If, during 1963—64, Berkeley's department,
with a graduate enrollment of over ninety students, had produced a
reasonable number of Ph. D. 's for that enrollment (say fourteen instead of
four), Berkeley's per cent of the top 20 production would have risen from
6.0 per cent to 18.2 per cent. I submit that an increase of such magnitude
would not have gone unnoticed in a very thin market. One can imagine
thedepartment facing a very difficult marketing operation; not only might 0 2
thejobs not be there, but within the fraternity of French departments, o o(I)
suchan increase might have been interpreted as a reduction in quality. 0
Thedepartment might have found it very difficult to regain its reputation
as a quality program. 0 0
Two additional representative tables are presented, covering the sup- 5
plyof Ph. D. 's in German (Table 7) and Political Science (Table 8), Since
both fields are typified by high attrition rates at Berkeley, the reader is
encouragedto consider the effect that tripling the department's output 2
would have had upon the market in each field.I believe that these
figures reveal a major determinant of each department's decision regard- Cl)
ingthe desirable number of Ph.D.'s to produce.
C.Placement of Berkeley Ph.D.'s
Earlierit was hypothesized that departments at Berkeley are not in- CO
teres ted in producing Ph.D. 's for all segments of the academic market, w
butoperate instead to produce a number that can be placed reasonably
I-.
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kwell within the prestige system. Underlying this view was the assump-
lion that quality of doctoral student placement reflects positively or
negatively upon the prestige of the producing institution; it was argued
that if a department "overproduced" to the extent that significant num-
bers of its placements were in inferior quality schools, the department's
reputation would suffer. These assertions are open to empirical test, the
purpose of this section.
In the theoretical section,it was suggested that conceptually one
could categorize the colleges and universities in this country into five
prestige classes, ranking them symbolically + +, +, 0, —,and——. The
argument was made that Berkeley departments control their output so
that the vast majority of placements will be made within the first three
groups; placements in the —and—— categorieswould be avoided by
not overproducing. To give meaning to these classifications, we turn
again to David Brown's publication Academic Labor Markets.24
For his own purposes, Brown produced a Prestige Index, by which he
ranked 1,121 U.S. colleges and universities. With numerous caveats, he
proposed the following eight factors as measuring elements of academic
prestige :25
1.percentage of faculty with Ph.D. 'S;
2.average compensation (salary and fringe benefits) per faculty
member;
3.percentage of students continuing to graduate school;
4.percentage of students studying at the graduate level;
5.number of volumes in library per full-time student;
6.total number of full-time faculty members;
7.faculty-student ratio; and
8.total current income per student.
Every school was ranked from 1 to 1,121 on each factor, and an average
rank, or composite rating, was computed for each institution. The
schools were then broken into six groups, labeled A through F, with
group A being the most prestigious, group F the least prestigious.
Brown's classification was accepted for the present study, with one
major change. The + + category in our conceptualization was reserved
for universities ranked 1 through 10 in each field by the Cartter Report,
for it was felt that the very highest prestige accrues to placement in such
schools. Brown's "A" ranking included colleges such as Amherst and
Swarthmore, which, while prestigious in their own way, do not have the
status of graduate-oriented research institutions. Consequently, Table 9
sets forth the definitions of our proposed prestige rating system.
It is not feasible to reproduce the list of all 1,121 schools; the in-
terested reader is referred to Brown's book. 28 To give an idea of the type
of school included in each category, a few examples are provided:









Brown's groups A and B• plus schools
ranked 11—20 in Cartter Report











SOURCE: Career Report, and Brown, Academic Labor Markets.
+ +Refer to Cartter Report for each field—generally the well-
known universities, such as Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Michi-
gan, etc.
+ Amherst, Swarthmore, Williams, Wellesley, Rochester, Uni-
versity of'California at San Diego, Tulane.
0 Antioch, Colorado College, George Washington University,
University of Colorado, Kansas, Rutgers, Ohio State, Temple.
— Universityof Alabama, Arizona, Butler, Central Michigan,
Clemson, East Texas State, Elmira College, San Diego State,
University of San Francisco, Southern Oregon.
—— AbileneChristian,California State Polytechnic, Brigham
Young, University of Dayton, DePaul, Florida A&M, Golden
Gate College, Slippery Rock, Memphis State, Seton Hall,
Washburn University.
Data on first academic position taken by Berkeley doctorates were
gathered from the National Academy of Sciences, "Survey of Earned
Doctorates."27 Beginning with fiscal year 1967, the computerized data
list the name of the first academic employer or postdoctoral institution;
thus, data on two years' placement (1967, 1968) were available for the
twenty-eight departments. A total of 466 academic appointments were
listed; of these, seventy-four new Ph.D's remained at Berkeley, pre-
sumably for postdoctoral work. These seventy-four were excluded from
the ratings. The remaining 392 were ranked according to prestige group-
ings described in Table 9. Results for the total placements are presented
in Table 10. Comparing the number of placements in each category to
the number of schools in each prestige group (Table 9), we note that
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schools ranked either + + or +, although these two categories encom-
pass only 75 colleges and universities. Furthermore, of the 428 institu-
tions listed as —— schools,only 12 secured the services of a Berkeley
Ph.D. The 410 schools representing ++, +, and 0 categories employed
87.5 per cent of the Berkeley graduates entering academia; the fact that
only 49 Berkeley doctorates (12.5%) accepted positions in one of the 711
institutions carrying a —or—— ratingsuggests that the departments
have not been interested in serving this sector of the market.
Our understanding of academic placementisenhanced by ex-
amining the positions accepted from 1962—63 to 1969—70 by the
graduates of Berkeley's English Department, a large department (492
graduate students enrolled in 1965—66) with attrition from the doctoral
program in excess of 80 per cent. Information was gathered from the
annual departmental reports of the Committee on Placements.28 Table
11 lists the schools where jobs were taken, by prestige grouping. Note
that of the 136 placements ranked on the prestige index, 118 (87%) were
in schools in the top three categories. Clearly, during the 1960s, Ber-
keley's English Department was not producing Ph. D. 's for the vast, less
prestigious portion of the academic market.
D. Interviewswith Faculty and Students
Thepurpose of interviewing faculty and students in several departments
was simply to gain more understanding of the factors perceived by the
participants as affecting time to degree and attrition. The theory of
Section II was not directly presented to the interviewees because we did
not wish to bias the response; instead, the differences in departmental
performance were described and interviewees were asked how they
41 David W. Breneman
SOURCE:National Academy of Sciences, "Surveyof Earned Doctorates," computer tape for Univer-


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































swould explain the relative performance of their department. Two senior
professors in each of five fields were interviewed separately for an hour
or more. The men were chosen for their knowledge of the program; in
all but one instance, the professors had been members of the Berkeley
faculty for 15 years or more. Students were interviewed in groups of
three to five, representing different amounts of time in the program.
Highlights of the interviews in three fields follow.
Chemistry
From faculty interviews, a clear picture of the economy of a Chemistry
Department emerged. A faculty member must publish in order to gain a
reputation so that he may acquire research grants with which to support
graduate students who help him produce more research so that larger
grants can be acquired allowing more students to be supported, etc.—a
true vicious circle. The department simply could not afford to have a
nonproductive faculty member, since each professor is expected to gen-
erate enough funds to support several students in a research group.
In this field, publish or perish is an understatement. I spend half my time
supervising graduate students, making sure that the work gets done, and the
other half in Washington begging for more money. My knuckles are raw from
bowing and scraping in front of those agencies. I think it's a great tribute to
our faculty that we manage to do as good a teaching job as we do under these
circumstances.29
The economic pressure to publish felt by faculty members in this field
has led to an efficient organizational adaptation in which faculty mem-
bers suggest topics and provide guidance and the graduate students do
the actual research. The final product is published jointly under both
names, with benefits flowing to both parties. The faculty member ex-
pands his publication list, thereby increasing his reputation and ability
to earn more grants, while the student gains his Ph.D. and a first
publication. The studentisthusacritical input into thefaculty
member's research production function, freeing the professor from the
tedious work in the laboratory and allowing him to operate more produc-
tively as a source of research proposals and as a fund raiser.
Back in the early 1940s when I was a young assistant professor at Berkeley
working 90 hours a week to get tenure, I actually did a research project by
myself one summer and published it under just my name. So many people
quizzed me about that at the professional meetings, questioning my sanity and
so forth, that I learned never to make that mistake again, and haven't pub-
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44 The Ph.D. Production Process 45 David W.One can understand why course work is kept to a minimum—the
student is simply much more valuable in the laboratory than in the
classroom.
The departmental decision regarding the number of graduate students
to admit has been dictated primarily by the availability of extramural
faculty grants which support graduate students and their research;
hence, external resources appear to be more important to the depart-
ment than internal resources. However, the department is keenly aware
of the work-load measures used by the university's budget personnel:
Even though our students take very few formal courses, they're all enrolled
for the maximum course load in 298's and 299's.3° Believe me, we produce
more than our share of student credit hours. -
Themarket's influence on departmental decisions governing the out-
put rate of Ph. D. 's was brought out in several comments:
When we're considering a marginal student in an oral exam, we know that if
we pass him he'll be able to get a job in an industrial lab somewhere and will
probably be a damn good chemist, so we generally let such students through.
Of course, if we had to place all our students in academic jobs, we'd have to
change our requirements and eliminate marginal students. We couldn't let as
many through.
As far as prestige is concerned, we view a placement in Bell Labs, or at
Dupont or• General Electric, as very acceptable, almost as good as a top
academic position. In general, however, we hope that our best students take
academic jobs.
Queried about the department's response to the currently worsened
job market, one professor expressed uncertainty as to whether this was a
temporary decline or represented a more permanent change. Should the
• decline be long-lived, he thought the department would reduce enroll-
ments somewhat (although noting that this would be resisted by many
professors), and that the curriculum would be revised to include more
course work in order to train less specialized, more flexible chemists.
The clear implication was that the product would be adapted to enhance
its marketability.
Two other factorsimportantly relatedtostudent successrates
emerged from the discussions. First, both professors stressed the value
of the student's belonging to a specific research group, a place where the
student could "hang his hat." This affiliation means that a professor is
concerned with the student's progress from the beginning and provides
a supportive group to bolster the student's confidence when the work
becomes discouraging. Secondly, it was very apparent that the faculty
45 David W. Breneman
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iand haven't pub-expect and want the students to succeed; we were told that if there were
any doubt concerning the ability of an applicant to earn the degree, he
would not be admitted. Thus, the faculty does not expect a high attrition
rate, an expectation that becomes self-fulfilling.
The chemistry students' description of the program was virtually
identical with the faculty description. The students agreed that there
was only one critical test—the ability to perform research adequately.
We don't sweat course work or exams or the German requirement. The only
thing that matters to the faculty is what we produce in the lab. The students
who are asked to leave are the ones who spend a year trying to do research
and make no progress.
When asked about student response to the worsening job market, it
was observed that students are beginning to stay in Berkeley for a fifth
year. By working as a T. A., the student can avoid the 25 per cent pay
reduction accorded R. A. 'S;31furthermore,it was noted that several
faculty members have not reduced student pay if the research being
done is useful. We asked the first-year student whether the worsening
market had affected his decision to enroll:
I don't give a damn about the poor market—who knows what it will be like
four years from now? I just don't think about it because I'm doing what I want
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Asked for their attitude toward the joint authorship of research, the
students responded favorably, indicating that it was, "a help in. establish-
ing a scientific career." Departmental organization into research groups
was strongly supported for giving the student a sense of belonging.
Morale in the department appeared to be very high.
We began both faculty interviews by inquiring into department policies
regarding graduate enrollments; we wanted to know how faculty
explained the growth of the department to 492 graduate students during
the 1965—66 academic year. The first professor was not aware of any
conscious policy regarding departmental size. He had noticed, however,
a tendency for enrollment growth to correspond rather closely to in-
creased faculty size. He did not express an opinion regarding the direc-
tion of causality.
The second professor offered numerous explanations. He stated that
the department had established objective criteria for admission and felt


















46 The Ph.D. Production Process David W.obligated to accept all qualified applicants, noting the absence of physi-
cal constraints such as laboratory space and' facilities that would restrict
enrollments. Next, he observed that English professors display near "mis-
sionary zeal" regarding the teaching of their subject, seeing their duty as
rescuing the country from "cultural barbarism and illiteracy." Presum-
ably, this made it harder for the department to reject applicants. Finally,
he commented:
In reality, I suspect our growth had a lot to do with the way the University
keeps its books—you know, that weighted enrollment formula. While this was
never overtly discussed when considering applicants, I know we all had in the
back of our minds the knowledge that more graduate students meant more
faculty. I'm sure most department members would never admit this, but I
think you should adopt a behavioral approach—don't go by what we say, but
by what we did.
This professor felt that the department had gotten far too large in terms
of both students and faculty.
What sense of community can you have when the chairman's annual cocktail
party for faculty, teaching assistants, and wives is attended by over 250
people? Why, we have to rent space off campus just to house the affair.
There are assistant professors who have been in the department for two or
three years whose names I don't even know. It's a bit embarrassing when I
pass them in the hall.
He felt that the department would be much better off if graduate
enrollments were reduced to a number small enough so that all students
could be supported. The loss of faculty positions that such a policy would
entail was viewed as an acceptable cost, perhaps even a move in the right
direction. "Perhaps we could regain a feeling of community."
The other professor did not express a desire for such substantial
change. Shocked by the worsening job market, he indicated that the
department was aiming for a steady-state enrollment of 340 Ph. D.
students, with 75 to 100 new doctoral students admitted each year.
When asked how many Ph. D. 's the department would want to award
annually when in that steady state, he indicated that "with the new
program we hope to reduce attrition to an acceptable level and award 30
to 40 Ph.D.'s each year."
Note that these figures imply an attrition rate in excess of 50 per cent,
and yet the professor clearly indicated that such performance would be
viewed by the English faculty as optimal. The pronounced difference
between faculty expectations in the English and Chemistry departments
certainly helps to explain why attrition rates differ so markedly. Of
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r
course, my fundamental argument is that these divergent faculty at-
titudes are a reflection of the different markets being served.
The English graduate students described the program as "a series of
hurdles accompanied by continual anxiety and humiliation." A third-year
student stressed the "feeling that you are not fully accepted by the
department until you've neared the end of the program." A second-year
student stated that, "the feeling in this department is, they're out to fail
you." She noted that during the first year in the program she met few of
her fellow students, largely because the. intense competition was not
conducive to friendships. And yet the students were stunned when
shown the data from Stark's study; they had no idea that so few students
actually earned the Ph.D.
The students described the Comprehensive and Oral examinations as
the major obstacles in the program. The open-ended nature of the
Comprehensive exam, coupled with the awareness that the department
would fail some of the students, made that exam a particularly frighten-
ing experience. Although the brochure states that students must take
the Comprehensive between the fourth and sixth quarter, the students
knew several people who had managed to postpone the exam until the
seventh or eighth quarter for fear of failure. (In keeping with the theory
of Section II, such behavior may be perfectly rational given the all-or-
nothing nature of the investment; an extra quarter's study is well spent if
it makes the difference between passing and failing. Faculty attitudes
are critical, for if the students know a certain number will be flunked,
the incentive is to expand study time and minimize that risk.)
The language requirements were not viewed as a direct cause of
attrition although it was felt that the Latin requirement does contribute
to the "disgust" which finally causes sOme people to leave the program.
The forced study of Latin is apparently viewed by many students as
highly irrelevant; one student commented that:
The faculty has preserved the Latin requirement because they view it as a
hurdle which demonstrates the high quality of the Berkeley graduate program
in English.
An advanced student argued that the department was constantly cOm-
paring its program to that of Yale and Harvard (the English departments
ranked number one and two ahead of Berkeley in the Cartter Report),
trying to outdo those two schools in the rigor of the doctoral program.
The Oral Examination was viewed as somewhat less an ordeal now
that the student's area of interest occupies a larger portion of the exam.
The students still characterized the exam as sadistic, marked by petti-faculty at-
served.
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ness and competition among faculty members. Fear of the exam and the
belief that a number will fail at that point does result in some post-
ponement beyond the prescribed tenth-to-twelfth quarter.
In general, the English students expressed considerable bitterness
toward their graduate experience. The faculty seem distant and un-
friendly, large portions of the curriculum seem pointless and irrelevant,
and the students express concern over their continually uncertain status
in the department. Financial problems are also a contributing factor; for
example, the second-year student had applied for a T.A. position next
year and had been named an alternate, but the department will not tell
her in what order she appears on the list. She expressed reluctance to
borrow more money for a degree "which gets farther and farther away."
One suspects that the willingness of humanities students to borrow is
considerably reduced by the perception that the investment is very risky
and replete with random factors over which the student has no control.
The nature of the Ph. D. curriculum in English, and the humanities in
general, with all the attendant uncertainties, may greatly reduce the
value of an option to borrow, needlessly compounding the financial
difficulties facing humanities students.
Electrical Engineering
Interviews in Electrical Engineering tended to confirm the theory al-
most precisely. One outspoken professor, having heard the topic de-
scribed, burst out immediately:
The differences between departments that you mention are obviously caused
by differences in demand. We're teaching useful, relevant material in our
department, and so we have a strong demand for our Ph.D.'s, both in
industry and in the universities. Our students have valuable options with the
M.S., and wouldn't stand for a lot of trivia in the Ph.D. program that wasted
their time. Graduate students in the humanities have no right to expect
financial support since those subjects are basically useless. No wonder they
can't get jobs.
He commented on the "insanity" of an institutional incentive system
that rewards departments for building up huge enrollments, regardless
of whether degrees are ever awarded.
The result is that a medieval corporation like the English Department packs
in graduate students by the hundreds and then tries to keep them around
forever because there aren't enough jobs. I'm sure that this crazy system has a
lot to do with the student unrest at Berkeley—who can blame students in
those departments for rioting?
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Regarding placement of the Electrical Engineering Department's Ph. D.
candidates, the professor indicated no preference for academic or in-
dustrial positions; the main concern is that students perform well in
whatever position they accept. One professor mentioned the importance
of feedback from industries employing the department's Ph.D. 'S; appar-
ently the Berkeley professors are very concerned that their students not
be outperformed by graduates of competing Electrical Engineering de-
partments.
I think it would be really sick if more than half of our Ph. D.'s went into
teaching each year. After all, we train our students to perform a useful service
to society, and we don't want them all merely instructing others.
One professor commented that the Mathematics and Physics depart-
ments had very foolishly allowed their curricula to become so academic
that industry was becoming increasingly less interested in hiring Ph. D. 's
from those departments.
The last thirty years have witnessed a tremendous broadening and deepening
of the engineering curriculum, allowing our doctoral students to compete very
effectively with students trained in the pure sciences. At this point, I think
our students have the edge over applied math students when it comes to
industrial positions.
The interviewer commented that the job market for Ph. D. electrical
engineers was reported to have worsened dramatically this year, and
asked what the department's response would be if the decline proved
long-lasting. The professor smiled and said, "We'd simply have to en-
force stricter standards and flunk a few more out."
SUPPLEMENTARYNOTE—1976
Inthe six years since this paper was written, several major changes
have occurred in the environment of graduate education nationally and
within California and the University of California specifically. Nationally,
the labor market for new Ph. D. 's switched dramatically from substantial
excess demand to conditions of oversupply in many fields, and the
federal government and many state governments sharply reduced sup-
port for graduate students and for research. In California, the budget
formula described in this paper was set aside and did not determine the
state appropriation for several years. New funding formulae have been
considered, including a proposal to change from an input to an output
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put to an output
budgeting approach based on degrees granted rather than on enrollment
levels.
At Berkeley, the Graduate Division now has the power to set graduate
enrollment ceilings for each department, and a simple debit-credit sys-
tem has been created to monitor departmental performance (depart-
ments are debited for each enrolled student-year and credited for each
Master's degree and Ph.D. awarded). The Graduate Division deter-
mines enrollment levels and the allocation of student financial support,
to a degree, on the basis of this monitoring system.
Changes in the environment and in the incentive system would be
expected to modify departmental performance, and an update of this
study would be most interesting. Investigation into the economic be-
havior of nonprofit institutions remains a challenging and intriguing area
of research.
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